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Wrong Pat Nugent?

Pat Nugent

Specialist 4, Inside Product

Dell Inc.

HQ Phone:  (512) 728-7800

Direct Phone: +61 * **** ****direct phone

Email: p***@***.com

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I agree to the Terms of Service and Privacy Policy. I understand that I will receive a subscription to ZoomInfo Community Edition at no charge in exchange for downloading and installing the ZoomInfo Contact Contributor utility which, among other features, involves sharing my business contacts as well as headers and signature blocks from emails that I receive.

Dell Inc.

One Dell Way

Round Rock, Texas, 78682

United States

Company Description

Dell Inc. (NASDAQ: DELL) listens to customers and delivers innovative technology and services that give them the power to do more. As the leading provider of healthcare IT services in the world, Dell helps healthcare organizations harness the power of informat...more

Find other employees at this company (110,910)

Background Information

Employment History

Fukushima Response Program Manager

Pacific Gas And Electric Company


Technical Support Engineering Manager

Pacific Gas And Electric Company


Head Coach

CDO


Affiliations

K-Life

Board Member


Education

mechanical engineering program

Cal Poly


Bachelor of Science Degree

Mechanical Engineering


Web References(149 Total References)


Board of Directors | K-LIFE FM

Pat Nugent
CFO Pat is a project engineering manager for PG&E, and is active in men's ministry at his church, with a commitment to discipleship.


Advisory Council Members | Tucson Move

Pat Nugent
Pima Community College, Head Football Coach


Twenty-fourth Annual Report, Volume 2, Public Meeting Minutes

Mr. Harbor then introduced Mr. Pat Nugent, Manager of the DCPP Fukushima Project to make the final informational presentation.
Mr. Harbor stated Mr. Nugent holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Mechanical Engineering and has more than 25 years of experience in the nuclear industry in Projects Engineering and Regulatory Services. Mr. Nugent reported he would be providing the DCISC with an update on PG&E's response to the Fukushima order issued in 2012. He stated DCPP is already designed for natural events such as large earthquakes and tsunamis and has margin for larger events already built into its design. A beyond design basis event is an event larger than what the analysis and design data for a plant would indicate is possible, as was seen at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan (Fukushima) in March of 2011. Mr. Nugent stated that to assure the consequences seen at Fukushima never occur at DCPP, PG&E is implementing a set of diverse and flexible strategies to cope with beyond design basis events and establish an extra layer of safety on top of what already exists. This is referred to as FLEX which he confirmed is not an acronym but a reference to diverse and flexible coping strategies. In response to Consultant Linnen's inquiry, Mr. Nugent confirmed that certain concepts within FLEX were included in strategies developed prior to DCPP being licensed, including a cooling water strategy which provided for equipment onsite and procedures and processes to enable the provision of cooling water to the plant using portable equipment. Mr. Nugent discussed the order of his presentation and reported unique design requirements and assumptions, different from the normal design-basis requirements, apply per NEI 12-06 and include: Mr. Nugent confirmed Dr. Budnitz observation that NEI 12-06 does not address the mechanism that may have caused the conditions to be addressed. A video produced by the NEI, which Mr. Nugent stated provided an overview of FLEX strategies, was played for the audience which featured DCPP and the Salem Nuclear Generating Station in New Jersey as the sites used in the video. In response to Consultant Wardell's observation Mr. Nugent confirmed that the last three bullets referenced in the FLEX design requirements and assumptions are also addressed in beyond design basis strategies and Mr. Nugent stated FLEX provides additional resources and strategies to deal with accidents. In response to Dr. Lam's question, Mr. Nugent confirmed that the NEI 12-06 requirements are essentially both industry and NRC regulatory requirements as the NRC has endorsed NEI 12-06 as an acceptable way to meet the requirement of NRC Order EA-12-049. Mr. Nugent reported NEI 12-06 requires five functions that must be maintained: To maintain core cooling Mr. Nugent reported water is injected into the steam generators using steam or diesel engine-driven pumps and heat is removed using the steam dump valves. The plant is then transitioned to use of a portable diesel engine-driven 4 kV generator to restore power to one train of shutdown cooling including to a residual heat removal pump, component cooling water pump, fan coolers, spent fuel cooling pumps, etc. Mr. Nugent reported RCS inventory is maintained by injecting borated water into the RCS to prevent criticality and compensate for minimal lost inventory. New shut down cooling seals will be installed in reactor coolant pumps in order to minimize flow out of the RCS even when all power is lost to the cooling of the seals. In response to Consultant Linnen, Mr. Nugent stated that the NEI 12-06 assumes the reactor is sub critical but as it cools down positive reactivity is added and borated water is injected to get the RCS to a condition where it would be sub critical even when cold. SFP cooling is maintained by removing heat in the SFPs by allowing the pools to boil and by providing periodic makeup water to the pools to maintain at least ten feet of water over spent fuel to provide adequate shielding from radiation. There is then a transition to use of a portable diesel engine-driven 4 kV generator to restore power to one train of SFP cooling. . In response to Dr. Budnitz' inquiry Mr. Nugent reported DCPP has sufficient water storage capability onsite, assuming a newly off loaded core is in the SFP, for 36 hours before the water level would approach ten feet above the top of the fuel. DCPP would have the capacity to add makeup water to the SFP within 24 hours through use of portable equipment. In response to Dr. Lam's inquiry, Mr. Nugent confirmed that with ten feet of water above the top of the fuel the radiation level on the SFP decks would be comparable to normal operation. Mr. Nugent reported DCPP would have several weeks before temperature or pressure increases would approach a challenge to the design of its containment structures. Mr. Nugent stated safety function support is provided by extending the battery bank life by load shedding station battery banks and recharge battery bank using a portable generator. Only loads required to monitor instrumentation and provide indications within the plant would remain on battery. The batteries are not used to power pumps or equipment other than instrumentation and there is sufficient battery life for approximately 30 hours with the expectation that the portable generator to provide recharging capabilities will be available in 24 hours. In response to Dr. Lam's inquiry, Mr. Nugent stated the original design life of a battery is about eight hours absent the effects of load shedding. Mr. Nugent reported that during the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami the Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Plant in Japan did not experience core damage due to plant personnel having employed what is termed FLEX on the Fly strategies which involved the use of portable equipment and that plant had to run approximately nine kilometers of electrical cable. He reported that at DCPP emergency cabling would be run from outside the Turbine Building, up stairways and into the battery room and those pathways have been evaluated. During the nineteenth refueling outages for each unit, transfer switches will be installed on a battery charger to allow the cables to plug into a transfer switch and he confirmed that some fire doors and watertight doors will need to remain open to support battery charging activities. Dr. Budnitz observed that at Fukushima Daini the operators discovered mismatched connections which required changing configurations and jumping cables and Mr. Nugent confirmed that compatibility of connection is being addressed in the design stage. Mr. Nugent reported the need for EASW due to initial loss of access to DCPP's ultimate heat sink, the Pacific Ocean, will be addressed by use of a portable pump to supply water from the intake cove through temporary piping tied into Auxiliary Saltwater System (ASW) to allow cooling of component cooling water heat exchangers. DCPP's storage strategy involves constructing primary and secondary storage facilities to store FLEX equipment that will survive Hosgri + 25% earthquake. Mr. Nugent stated the deployment of FLEX equipment required the plant to evaluate potential debris sources, the time required to remove debris, and to identify equipment required to remove that debris. Mr. Nugent reviewed the schedule for implementation of FLEX which requires that FLEX be implemented by fall 2015 for U-1 and by spring 2016 for U-2. He reported FLEX strategy document-only design changes, which provide all details associated with the basis of each strategy he discussed, are nearly complete. Equipment specifications are complete and the remaining equipment will be ordered by July 31, 2014, and delivered by January 2015 and some equipment has already been delivered and is onsite. Documentation and location of that existing equipment have been provided to control rooms in the interim. Mr. Nugent stated training has been provided to Operations personnel and additional training will be provided to Operations, Security, Emergency Response Organization, and general plant population in 2015. FLEX implementation procedure development will start in July 2014 and is scheduled to be completed by January 2015. A self-assessment using industry peers is scheduled for fall of 2014. A successful validation and dry-run of the EASW was completed two weeks ago with the pump positioned at the intake cove and one train of piping, approximately one-quarter of a mile in length, installed up to the plant to validate the strategy. In response to Consultant Wardell's question Mr. Nugent replied installation of the piping is estimated to take 18 hours. Storage locations have been identified and include Warehouse B where remodeling is in progress as of May 2014, and is scheduled to be completed by January 2015 to support FLEX equipment receipt. The area of the 500 kV switchyard area has been identified for a second storage facility and storage pad design in progress and expected to complete design in fall 2014, and expected to complete construction in spring 2015. In response to Dr. Budnitz' observation Mr. Nugent confirmed the elevation of Warehouse B is 115 feet above sea level and the 500 kV switchyard facility will be 300 feet above sea level. Staging routes and deployment paths for equipment, cables, pipes and hoses have been evaluated and debris removal methods and times identified. Mr. Nugent reported two offsite Regional Response Centers to provide backup of portable FLEX equipment have been established and located in Phoenix, Arizona, and Memphis, Tennessee. The Phoenix Center provides support to DCPP and was operational as of May 2014. The Regional Response Center is aware of the equipment available onsite at DCPP and has equipment which would serve as a backup for any piece of onsite equipment as well as other potentially useful equipment. These facilities are run by the Plant Inventory Management organization which Mr. Nugent stated is a cooperative effort between Southern Nuclear and the Areva firm. Implementation plans for individual plants will be developed approximately four months before required FLEX implementation dates and include doing dry runs of the strategies and identification of which equipment will be delivered to a plant within 24 hours of the request and how the equipment will be transported to the plant. He stated that in the case of DCPP this may include the use of heavy-lift transport helicopters. DCPP served as a pilot plant for equipment deployment. In summarizing his presentation Mr. Nugent stated existing plant design is robust and has margin to handle events in excess of the design basis. In response to Dr. Budnitz' inquiry as to how long equipment staged at the Phoenix Regional Response Center would take to arrive at DCPP and how it would be delivered Mr. Nugent replied that DCPP strategies assume extensive damage to local infrastructure and access roads and bridges. DCPP equipment would be delivered from Phoenix to the Paso Robles Airport, 35 miles distant from the plant and, in the event roads were impassable, heavy-lift helicopters would be used to airlift the first equipment, a portable 4 kV generator, to DCPP within 25 hours following the event and through the use of portable cabling the vital 4 kV bus would then be reenergized within 72 hours. In response to Dr. Budnitz' inquiry, Mr. Nugent reported estimates to implement FLEX strategies are in the range of $65-$75 million including the initial startup costs of the Regional Response Centers. Dr. Budnitz further observed that the probability that something associated with the FLEX strategy will fail could only be determined by a site specific probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and Mr. Nugent replied the industry is dealing with that question but has not done a probabilistic analysis to determine the probability of the strategies themselves failing. Mr. Nugent agreed that there will always be unknowable variables which cannot be solved either technically or economically and he observed that FLEX strategies are specifically designed to be flexible and diverse enough to address situations beyond the design requirements established by the NRC as part of NEI 12-06 to deal with vulnerabilities which have not yet been identified and those strategies should still work and provide procedures flexible enough to address conditions that exist at the site. Dr. Lam agreed the federal regulations represent the law and questions about the adequacy of the federal regulations are an entirely different matter but he stated he wonders whether at some point a scenario other than as addressed in Mr. Nugent's presentation and by the NEI 12-06 assumptions might occur. Mr. Nugent and Dr. Budnitz observed the plant is meeting the requirements associated with the public policy established by the NRC safety goal and must have and expend the resources now and in the future to continue to do so. Mr. Nugent replied the NRC is providing extensive oversight and in the fall of 2013 performed a documentation audit of all U.S. nuclear plants to confirm their strategies complied with the requirements of NEI 12-06. As each plant approaches implementation, four to six months prior to implementation the NRC will do another audit to confirm the preparedness of the plant to implement FLEX strategies and six months after complete implementation the NRC will conduct an inspection to confirm all requirements are met which DCPP now expects will be confirmed in a Safety Evaluation similar to that done for the plant's original license. In response to Consultant Wardell's inquiry about integration of the FLEX procedures with the Severe Accident Management Guidelines, Extreme Damage Mitigation Guidelines, and Emergency Procedures, Mr. Nugent stated DCPP is specifically evaluating this issue and how the procedures interface and he stated that in some instances existing guidelines will become FLEX guidelines and procedures will be amended to include handoff to FLEX procedures to allow the procedures to function in an integrated fashion. In response to Mr. Wardell's inquiry, Mr. Nugent stated that by the first quarter of 2015 DCPP is expecting to have all FLEX procedures written in final format and either approved or ready for approval and the procedure process to get from one procedure to another will be established at that time. In response to Dr. Budnitz' inquiry, Mr. Nugent confirmed he has contact with managers working at other nuclear plants on issues related to FLEX and its implementation and is working through the STARS joint utility resource sharing organization and with his counterparts at STARs' other plants and there are periodic meetings of personnel working on Fukushima-related issues sponsored by INPO, the NEI and the NRC and he confirmed that the NRC is periodically reviewing the industry progress to make sure plants are taking actions to implement FLEX consistent with NRC guidance and opportunities exist to receive clarification on the NEI 12-06 guidelines. Ms. Becker requested a copy of the power points used by Mr. Nugent during his presentation. Mr. Nugent, in response to Dr. Groote's inquiry, stated that ocean transportation of equipment to DCPP by barge has been considered but it is not considered to be a primary strategy as the infrastructure connected with barge transportation could be damaged in a severe event and a tsunami event could damage the barges.


PG&E Employees | PG&E Currents

While most engineers thrive while working with numbers, principles and designs, Pat Nugent, director of quality verification at Diablo Canyon Power Plant, is different.
He is a "people" person.


http://www.pgecurrents.com/2015/10/22/diablo-canyon-power-plant%e2%80%99s-pat-nugent-a-different-kind-of-engineer/

Diablo Canyon Power Plant's Pat Nugent: A Different Kind of Engineer
In recognition of Nuclear Science Week, Pacific Gas and Electric Company's Diablo Canyon Power Plant spotlights Pat Nugent and how he works to make both the plant and the Central Coast community a better place. While most engineers thrive while working with numbers, principles and designs, Pat Nugent, director of quality verification at Diablo Canyon Power Plant, is different. He is a "people" person. He enjoys the human interaction of making sure the plant's policies and practices are sound, conform to both Diablo Canyon standards and federal regulations, and protect its employees, the environment and the residents of the Central Coast. Pat Nugent sees Diablo Canyon as a vital element in the effort to meet the state's energy needs while reducing its use of fossil fuels. "I like working with people. I spent a lot of time in high school doing public speaking and I spent my youth as a Boy Scout - I'm an Eagle Scout. I've volunteered locally with the Boy Scouts in the past. I like working with people as much as most engineers probably enjoy working with numbers," said Nugent, who began working for Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) while attending Cal Poly. Nugent wasn't really aware of Diablo Canyon when he enrolled in the mechanical engineering program at Cal Poly in 1984. But over the following four years, he worked his way into a job as a groundman with a PG&E line crew and wound up with an internship at Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station, a plant operated by the Sacramento Municipal Utility District from 1975 to 1989 that was not far from his hometown of El Dorado Hills. About a year after that summer internship, Nugent sought out a faculty advisor to see if he could get a co-op job at Diablo Canyon. When he learned there were two spots available that hadn't been advertised, he "crashed the interview" and wound up with a position in regulatory services which fit him perfectly. "It gave me the opportunity to not always be behind a computer doing calculations all of the time, but to use my understanding of engineering and engineering principles and system interactions with being able to work with people. And I really like that," he said. He served in several positions in regulatory services including as a supervisor for five years and a manager for two years. He also served two-and-a-half years in mechanical systems engineering. In 2005, he was loaned by PG&E to the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations to work as a senior equipment reliability evaluator, a position he held for about 15 months. When he returned to Diablo Canyon he served two years as a project engineering manager, three years as technical support engineering manager before taking over other projects. In June, he was appointed as the station's quality verification director. Nugent sees Diablo Canyon, which produces nearly 10 percent of all the electricity generated in California and 20 percent of the electricity PG&E's customers use - free of greenhouse gas emissions - as a vital element in the effort to meet the state's energy needs while reducing its use of fossil fuels. He also sees the station and its employees as integral pieces of the Central Coast community. "Diablo Canyon is the biggest single clean-electricity generating source in the state. PG&E is also the largest private employer in the county and that is due to Diablo Canyon. The people at the plant are a huge economic asset to the county," said Nugent, who has volunteered with several local organizations, donates his time as chief financial officer of a local nonprofit radio station, and is training coordinator for the San Luis Obispo County Sheriff's Department dive team.


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