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Emile Nakhleh, A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 184 pp., $26.95.
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In an informative and revealing book, A Necessary Engagement, Emile Nakhleh, a former director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program in the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence, says that although midlevel U.S. officials knew better than to frame the war in black-and-white terms, ever-expanding the territory of the enemy, they had little say and input in decision making.
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Nakhleh paints a grim and stark portrait of the failures of U.S. policy makers to understand the most basic attitudes that Muslims have of themselves, each other and the West.
He is bitter about the resistance of senior Bush officials to learning about the complexity and diversity of religiously based movements in the Muslim world, despite the numerous efforts he and top CIA analysts undertook to better guide them.
One of Nakhleh’s central arguments is that there are qualitative, dramatic differences and distinctions between bin Laden’s violent global jihadists and mainstream political-Islamist parties with a huge social base, like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine.
Nakhleh argues that while the former should be confronted and excluded, the latter “should be welcomed as potentially credible partners in the political transformation of their societies.â€
Instead, the Bush team viewed the Muslim world with its 1.4 billion citizens through “the prism of terrorism,†lumping al-Qaeda terrorists with religious activists who have shown “their commitment to the democratic process and their pragmatic approach to politics and political change.†According to Nakhleh, this was the worst thing the United States could do.
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1 On the Iraq threat, for example, Nakhleh writes that before and during the invasion, “briefings informed the administration that defeating Saddam’s army and toppling his regime were not the real challenge to the United States; planning for the ‘morning after’ was the true challenge.â€