John Timbers This is Me

 Web References

1. 1. CFM of Connecticut v. Chowdhury

   www.BrownWelsh.com/HPLowry_arc - [Cached]

   Published on: 3/15/1993   Last Visited: 6/26/2008

   This case involves a tangled thicket of motions, claims and counter-claims, all of which return to the question immediately before the court: Who is the rightful owner of the stock CFM of Connecticut and which counsel, Tarlow, Levy & Droney or Attorney John Timbers, properly and lawfully represents the plaintiff in this action?
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   Timbers refused and the "new CFM" fired him, and retained Tarlow, Levy & Droney which immediately filed a withdrawal of this action.
   
   Attorney Timbers and his client initially responded to Tarlow, Levy & Droney's appearance by moving to strike the appearance and the withdrawal filed by it.Attorney Timbers subsequently withdrew those motions and now insists that the withdrawal filed by Tarlow, Levy & Droney is binding upon the court, but refuses to concede that the stock of CFM is now owned by 294 Farmington or that Tarlow, Levy & Droney in fact represents CFM.Attorney Timbers has candidly acknowledged that if Tarlow, Levy & Droney's withdrawal is permitted to stand, without any finding by the court that it is the duly authorized counsel for plaintiff, he intends to reinstitute this action either in the name of CFM or another entity to which CFM claims to have assigned the interests in the litigation.
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   Attorney Timbers, meanwhile, was counsel to CFM and TM both prior to and subsequent to the commencement of this action.As more fully set forth below, at about the time that 294 Farmington purchased the stock of CFM, Attorney Timbers devised a strategy to issue and sell the outstanding, but unissued 4,000 remaining shares of CFM in an effort to defeat 294 Farmington's purchase of CFM.He also prepared a fee agreement which, inter alia, prohibited CFM from settling the instant action without his consent unless he were paid a fee equal to the number of hours worked on this case times twice his hourly fee. n1 Additionally, Attorney Timbers was elected Assistant Secretary of CFM and as such is responsible for the corporate records and books.
   
   n1 The Court, Berger, J., referred Attorney Timbers to the Statewide Grievance Committee as a result of his fee agreement with CFM.That agreement prohibited CFM from discontinuing this litigation without Timbers' permission unless Timbers is paid twice his hourly fee.
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   It instructed Attorney Timbers by letter dated July 25, 1991, to withdraw all pending litigation, including this action.Timbers refused to heed that directive, and CFM immediately retained Tarlow, Levy & Droney to file an appearance in lieu of Attorney Timbers and to file a withdrawal of this case.That withdrawal was filed with the court on July 29, 1991.
   
   In response to Tarlow, Levy & Droney's appearance and the withdrawal filed by it, Attorney Timbers filed in open court on August 2, 1991 a motion to strike Tarlow, Levy & Droney's "purported" appearance and its "purported" withdrawal.In his motion Attorney Timbers assigned five reasons why the appearance and withdrawal were ineffective.The principal claims were that: (1) the 4,000 remaining, unissued shares of stock of CFM were in fact issued and sold to Mr. Cote and Mr. Feigenbaum on July 23, one day prior to the Bankruptcy auction, such that they, and not 294 Farmington owned a controlling interest in CFM; (2) CFM assigned the cause of action in this case to TM, also on July 23, such that CFM was not authorized to withdraw this action; and (3) CFM's fee agreement with Timbers prohibited CFM from withdrawing the litigation without Timbers' consent or CFM paying Timbers' attorney's fees calculated at twice his hourly rate, neither of which condition had been satisfied.
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   On August 2, 1991, the Court, Berger, J., upon motion of Tarlow, Levy & Droney, stayed further proceedings in this case and referred Attorney Timbers to the Statewide Grievance Committee for investigation of possible violation by Timbers of Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.The Court also referred the matter to the Bankruptcy Court for its determination of the lawful owner of CFM stock.On January 6, 1992, Tarlow, Levy & Droney filed in this court "Application For Quo Warranto and a determination of Interests", in which it requested a ruling that 294 Farmington Realty is the sole shareholder of CFM.On January 15, 1992, Attorney Timbers withdrew his motion to "Strike Tarlow, Levy & Droney's Purported Withdrawal and . . . Appearance", thereby, in his estimation, giving full effect to the withdrawal such that there is no longer, according to him, a pending case before this court, and therefore no basis for considering the application for quo warranto.
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   Although Attorney Timbers filed a Motion to Strike the Purported Appearance and Withdrawal filed by Tarlow, Levy & Droney, he withdrew that motion on January 15, 1992.Therefore, he argues that the withdrawal is binding and effective, such that there is no longer a pending case before the court.
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   Attorney Timbers now renews his claim that the court lacked jurisdiction to conduct such a hearing, claiming that his clients do not object to the withdrawal of this case such that there is nothing pending before this court.Specifically, he argues that once the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is raised, the court cannot proceed until it resolves that issue.See, Respondents' Third Memorandum In Support of Their Motion To Dismiss (August 2, 1992).Attorney Timbers correctly points out that
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   Timbers further asserts that if the court adopts his position, he intends to refile this action.
   
   Attorney Timbers' argument, if accepted, would hold the resolution of this case hostage to some unknown time in the future when the very question he seeks to avoid will inevitably be raised.If, as he promises, this action is refiled by him it is inevitable that Tarlow, Levy & Droney will move to dismiss the action, arguing that its clients, not Timbers' clients, are the rightful owners of CFM.
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   n3 Attorney Timbers has filed a battery of objections to the petition for quo warranto.In addition to his claim that the court lacks jurisdiction because there is no case pending before it, he also alleges that a quo warranto proceeding must be instituted by the filing of a writ, summons and complaint, and cannot be initiated by the filing of a motion, as was done in this case.
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   These officers were Roger Cote, President; Donald Feigenbaum, Secretary/Treasurer; and John Timbers, Assistant Secretary.
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   It does find, however, that Attorney Timbers, as Secretary, was responsible for maintaining corporate books and records pertaining to the sale of the CFM stock, and that despite being served with a subpoena duces tecum directing him to produce corporate records of the sale, including stock certificates, he failed to produce such documents.
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   6. Tarlow, Levy and Droney is authorized counsel for CFM, Inc. and its appearance in lieu of Attorney John Timbers is recognized as valid as of July 29, 1991.
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   The filing and withdrawal by CFM of various motions, including the motion to recuse Judge Susco, resulted in defendants seeking attorney's fees from CFM and Attorney Timbers.
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   By written decision dated June 13, 1991, Judge Miano concurred with defendants' allegations and assessed approximately $3,000 in attorney's fees against Attorney Timbers, having found that his motion to recuse Judge Susco was made in bad faith and without a colorable basis.
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   Judge Susco, in an order dated August 31, 1990, assessed $10,000 in attorney's fees against Attorney Timbers.
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   Because Attorney Timbers has not paid either assessment defendants have filed a motion for contempt which is presently pending before this court.
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   It was at this hearing that Attorney Timbers disclosed that Messrs.
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   This disclosure, prompted, amongst other things, Tarlow, Levy & Droney's motions to refer Attorney Timbers to the Statewide Grievance Committee and to the U.S. Attorney.The Court, Berger, J., referred Attorney Timbers to the Grievance Committee; see note 1, supra.

2. 2. CFM of Connecticut v. Chowdhury

   www.BrownWelsh.com/HPLowry_arc - [Cached]

   Published on: 11/16/1989   Last Visited: 6/26/2008

   On July 20, 1989, plaintiff issued a notice signed by its attorney, John Timbers.On the same date, Mr. Timbers served the notice to quit on the defendants by leaving it "with the person in charge of operation at the premises ... " When defendants did not vacate "on or about August 1, 1989," Plaintiff filed this action.Mr. Timbers signed the writ, summons and complaint and entered his appearance for plaintiff.
   
   Defendants argue that Mr. Timbers was not either a proper officer or an indifferent person required by Conn. Gen.Stat. § 47a-23(c).
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   Since Mr. Timbers as attorney for CFM had issued the notice to quit, it cannot be said that he was impartial.See also Harmel Realty v. Lejeune, 1986 Conn. Super.LEXIS 145, SPH 3603-32A95 (1986) H # 750 and Battison v. Martinez, SPH 8506-28960 (1985) H # 670.