USDOJ/OIG FBI Labs Report -
[Cached Version]
Published on: 4/16/2001
Last Visited: 9/17/2001
In a letter to the OIG dated April 8 , 1995 , Whitehurst alleged that CTU examiner Ronald Kelly , without being properly qualified , had prepared a report that identified smokeless powder in a pipe bomb sent to a federal judge.Whitehurst further contended that the analysis in the case was flawed because it did not determine if materials other than smokeless powder were present in the bomb.He also suggested that Roger Martz , as chief of the CTU , violated FBI policies by assigning the case to Kelly.
To investigate the allegations , we reviewed the Laboratory report and Kelly's notes and other work papers.We also interviewed Kelly , Roger Martz , Steven Burmeister , and Robert Heckman.
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We conclude that Kelly did not violate any FBI policies or procedures through his work on the case.His identification of smokeless powder appears to be technically correct and is supported by his notes and analytical data.We also conclude that Martz did not violate any FBI policy in assigning Kelly to work on the case.
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Ronald Kelly became qualified as a forensic chemist examiner in the FBI Laboratory in February 1995.Before then , he had worked in the CTU since September 1978 as a physical science technician.Because Kelly is not an FBI agent , he was not eligible to become an examiner until relatively recently.Kelly told us that his particular expertise is in arson and fire examinations.He also has worked on the analysis of smokeless powders since 1985.During 1995 , he was training to become qualified as an explosives residue examiner.
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Roger Martz , chief of the CTU , recalled assigning the case to Ronald Kelly because Burmeister was unavailable.
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Kelly did not think there was anything unusual about the analysis in the case , as he had previously worked on many smokeless powder cases.Heckman , Kelly stated , asked him only to identify , by brand name if possible , the suspected smokeless powder in the device.
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Accordingly , Kelly did not understand Heckman to have requested a comprehensive analysis of the materials to determine if substances other than smokeless powder may have been present.
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On receiving the evidence , Kelly followed the CTU's written protocol for the identification of smokeless powders.Initially , he examined the samples with a microscope and measured and otherwise noted the physical characteristics of the powder , which in this case included the presence of yellow dots.Kelly then prepared an extraction with methylene chloride and conducted an analysis on the Gas Chromatograph/Mass Spectrometer.The results indicated that particular samples were double base smokeless powder.He also confirmed the presence of nitrocellulose , a component of smokeless powder , in one sample through the use of Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy.
Based on his examination of the evidence , Kelly prepared dictation for a Laboratory report dated March 18 , 1995.That report notes that , A [ s ] pecimens Q1 , Q2 , Q4 , and Q7 were identified as double base smokeless powders suitable for future comparison.After performing some additional work on the GC/MS , Kelly prepared a second dictation on April 6 , 1995 , noting that the identified specimens were Aphysically and chemically consistent with Hi-Skor 700-x smokeless powder.
No suspect was identified in the Shaw case.We understand that no further analytical work has been done by the Laboratory since April 1995.
III. Analysis of Whitehurst's Allegations
Whitehurst contends that Kelly should not have examined the evidence because Kelly had not been qualified as an examiner of explosives residue.Whitehurst also maintains that the analysis was flawed because it may have overlooked certain materials present in addition to smokeless powders.Finally , he suggests that Roger Martz violated Laboratory policies in assigning the case to Kelly.Whitehurst did not work on the Shaw case himself , and he did not discuss any of his concerns with either Kelly or Heckman.
We do not find that Kelly performed the analysis without qualifications then required within the Laboratory.Kelly became qualified as an examiner in forensic chemistry in February 1995.Forensic chemist examiners in the CTU had been analyzing smokeless powders since the 1980s.When Kelly worked on the Shaw case , there was no stated FBI policy that the analysis of smokeless powders had to be done by explosives residue examiners as distinct from forensic chemists such as Kelly.
Nor do we find that Martz violated any Laboratory policies in assigning the case to Kelly.
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Kelly , when interviewed in December 1995 , said he understood the explosives residue protocol to apply to the examination of residues from exploded devices.Kelly maintained that the smokeless powder protocol would be sufficient in particular cases , such as Shaw , where the auxiliary examiner is asked merely to identify smokeless powder.
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In analyzing the smokeless powder in the Shaw case , Kelly did examine the material with a microscope.He told us that he did not observe anything other than the particles of what appeared to be smokeless powder.It is conceivable , however , that some other inorganic materials were present which , if not identified in the microscopic examination , might also have escaped detection through the GC/MS and FTIR analyses that Kelly performed.
On a related point , we think the Shaw case suggests a general need to clarify the respective roles of the CTU examiner , in this case Kelly , and the EU examiner in identifying procedures to followed.Kelly recalled that he understood Heckman to have requested only a confirmation that smokeless powder was present and a possible identification of its manufacturer.
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We conclude that Kelly did not violate FBI policies by his work on the Shaw case.Nor do we find that Martz violated any policy by assigning Kelly to work on the case.