Pavel Felgengauer This is Me

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1. 1. in.news.yahoo.com

   in.news.yahoo.com/137/20080818 - [Cached]

   Published on: 8/18/2008   Last Visited: 8/18/2008

   Russian military analyst Pavel Felgengauer said hardliners in Moscow wanted the conflict to achieve Saakashvili's overthrow and the destruction of the Georgian army and would be disappointed with a lesser result.
   
   He argued that the Georgian military, though it withdrew in the face of Russian advances, had escaped without serious casualties or materiel losses.

2. 2. www.amina.com

   www.amina.com/article/icbrief3 - [Cached]

   Published on: 5/3/1996   Last Visited: 4/17/2008

   In an article in Segodnya, Russian commentator Pavel Felgengauer declared that there had been intensive informal contacts between the Russian authorities and the inner circle of new Chechen leaders, Yandarbiev and Aslan Maskhadov.
   ...
   Felgengauer asserted that the storming of Bamut by Russian troops had not in fact been a senseless act, as the weakening of the more radical forces concentrated around Bamut might actually strengthen the moderate wing of pro-Dudaev Chechens.

3. 3. WMD Insights

   www.wmdinsights.com/I11/I11_R2 - [Cached]

   Last Visited: 6/17/2008

   It is possible, however, that another factor, suggested by Pavel Felgengauer, a well known Russian journalist and critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin's government, is also motivating Iran.
   ...
   In mid-November 2006, presumably reflecting a decision made earlier, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran planned to install a uranium enrichment cascade of 3,000 centrifuges by March 2007; currently it has two cascades of 164 centrifuges in operation, as it attempts to master this technology. [12] Felgengauer has speculated that since enrichment of uranium to the low level necessary to produce nuclear power plant fuel is more difficult than further enriching low-enriched uranium to the level needed for nuclear weapons, the transfer of 80 tons of Russian low-enriched uranium to Iran could offer Tehran the ability to produce weapon-grade uranium on an accelerated basis by taking the fuel and further enriching it.
   ...
   Apparently because of such concerns, according to Felgengauer, "Washington has already told Russia that, while the continued slow construction of Bushehr is OK, the actual transfer of nuclear fuel without a comprehensive solution of the Iranian nuclear problem is unacceptable."[14]
   
   Although the Russia-Iran negotiations of September 2006 appeared to set a firm date for the completion of Bushehr nuclear power plant, the issue is apparently not yet closed.In November 2006, an unnamed source in Rosatom claimed that the completion date could still slip even further.The new schedule, he said, is "realizable, but optimistic," and much will depend on how each party implements its own obligations, in particular whether the Iranian side fulfills its financial obligations. [15] Given that caveat and uncertainties regarding the outcome of the sanctions debate at the UN Security Council, it is clear that the last page of the story about Bushehr has yet to be written.