Mr Lance Collins This is Me

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1. 1. Latest Comment - Australia Defence Association

   www.ada.asn.au/LatestComment_f - [Cached]

   Published on: 1/7/2007   Last Visited: 9/10/2007

   Virtually every news or opinion article on the criticisms made by Lieutenant Colonel Lance Collins has missed the essential points concerned.
   
   They have also mostly failed to note the detailed Australia Defence Association submission to last year's parliamentary inquiry into the intelligence services - which listed several indicative intelligence and policy failures over the last 25 years and discussed their apparent causes.
   
   These examples included the marked and vicious bureaucratic resistance in some quarters to the 1998 and 1999 intelligence estimates concerning East Timor produced by Lance Collins and his staff.
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   The clash between Lieutenant Colonel Lance Collins and some senior managers at the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) exemplify many of these problems.
   
   Collins, while somewhat stubborn, is a through-career intelligence professional immersed in an objective institutional culture and highly skilled in the intelligence estimate process. As an ADF officer he is also primarily and heavily customer-focused, especially towards the operational needs and safety of the main end user of his work - the men and women of the defence force.
   
   As an Army intelligence officer, Collins has also acquired a broad range of professional intelligence skills.

2. 2. East Timor News Digest 8 - August 1-31, 2005

   www.asia-pacific-action.org/so - [Cached]

   Published on: 8/1/2005   Last Visited: 2/7/2006

   Australian spy was a traitor - Collins - Sydney Morning Herald
   ...
   Australian spy was a traitor - Collins
   ...
   The claim is made in Plunging Point, a book by the army intelligence whistleblower Lance Collins and a former Australian Security and Intelligence Service agent, Warren Reed.
   ...
   Mr Collins, who this month left the army, where he served as head of intelligence operations during the East Timor conflict -- came to prominence after he alleged there was a pro-Jakarta lobby in the foreign affairs and defence departments. His book adds some flesh to those assertions, saying that "Indonesian intelligence services have certainly penetrated the Australian intelligence system", notably in the Australian Security and Intelligence Service.
   ...
   Jon Lamb -- On July 25, Lieutenant Colonel Lance Collins, a leading intelligence expert on East Timor and Indonesia, blew the whistle on the Australian Defence Force's intelligence manipulation and cover-ups in East Timor in 1999.
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   Collins has also quit the military because, he said, intelligence information was being skewed to defend government policy. Speaking on the ABC's Australian Story on July 25, Collins said, "The problem with our intelligence system is it's the politicians that choose, or approve the choosing of, the bureaucrats that run it. The system is very heavily weighted to produce a certain answer that is acceptable to a certain political party and its agenda, rather than the nation and its wellbeing." As part of the Interfet operation, Collins was part of the ADF's intelligence gathering on the pro-Jakarta militia gangs that terrorised the East Timorese during 1999.
   
   Collins' understanding of the links between the militia and the Indonesian military was extensive. It contrasted sharply with the Howard government's line from late 1998 and throughout 1999 that the TNI (Indonesian military) and the Indonesian police were attempting to control the militia gangs and providing security for the independence ballot.
   
   "In 1998, there was increasing instability and violence in East Timor and a renewed momentum behind the independence movement", Collins stated. "There was a regional crisis unfolding, as I and others perceived it. We did what's called a 'formal intelligence estimate' and we pointed out that up until now Australian foreign policy had been driven by what we called the 'Jakarta lobby'." Collins became increasingly critical of the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) and the International Policy Division bulletins. "I thought the intelligence reporting was too equivocal and quite vague. And so, I and others attempted to draw their attention to errors of fact, which wasn't appreciated." In response to his criticisms, the DIO sent a letter to Collins' superiors requesting he stop openly questioning DIO reports. Collins (along with solidarity and human rights organisations) continued to forewarn that the TNI would not accept a vote in favour of independence and would unleash a wave of militia terror and reprisal.
   
   According to Collins, as the situation in East Timor deteriorated, "there was a lot of conflict in the intelligence system at the time".
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   Collins and other intelligence associates were shocked by Jenkins' death. "It certainly registers as something very wrong in the system when you have people inside the military and intelligence system for all their working lives, and they suddenly commit suicide.
   
   "When the news came out that the death had occurred after being visited by people from the Defence Security Agency and Foreign Affairs, there was a clear message: if you step out of line, there will be consequences", Collins said.
   
   After nationwide protests forced the Howard government to send troops to protect the East Timorese in 1999, Collins acted as a senior intelligence adviser to the Interfet command. His observations would have provided more evidence of the TNI links to the militia gangs, including their activity in West Timor.
   
   Collins believes that because of his previous criticisms, senior DIO figures ramped up the pressure while he was serving in East Timor.
   
   He told Australian Story: "I was involved in a conversation with a fellow from the Defence Intelligence Organisation. We finished the phone call and then what was called the GIS link went down and I had my signals officer spend the rest of that day looking for what we assumed was a technical problem. We didn't find out until the next morning that it had been turned off." The DIO also sought to close down intelligence gathering from West Timor, where 150,000 East Timorese were being kept captive in camps run by the militia gangs, with the support of the TNI. On his return to Australia, Collins was warned to keep his head down. Later in 2000, Collins was one of several investigated by the federal police about embarrassing intelligence leaks which proved the Howard government lied about what it knew about militia and TNI links. It was the beginning of the end of Collins' intelligence career.
   
   In an effort to clear his name and defend his criticisms of the intelligence hierachy, Collins requested an independent inquiry, which was eventually conducted by a long-time serving naval officer Captain Martin Toohey.
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   Toohey found in favour of Collins, stating in his report, released last year that: "I find as a fact that a pro-Jakarta lobby exists within DIO which distorts intelligence estimates to the extent that those estimates are heavily driven by government policy.
   ...
   The treatment of Collins and others within defence and intelligence organisations who dared question government policy -- on East Timor or the war in Iraq -- reflects this government's determination.

3. 3. Paperchain Bookstore Manuka Online - events

   www.paperchainbookstore.com.au - [Cached]

   Published on: 11/4/2005   Last Visited: 3/13/2008

   As former intelligence officers with the military and ASIS, Lance Collins and Warren Reed are ideally placed to assess these claims.
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   Lance Collins Lance Collins joined the Australian Army in 1979, graduating from the Officer Cadet School into the Intelligence Corps. After various Army appointments, Collins was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1995. He served with the Headquarters of the Joint Coalition Task Force in Kuwait in 1998 during the crisis that resulted in the withdrawal of the UN arms inspectors. In 1999 Collins was appointed as the senior intelligence officer for the UN International Force East Timor, which conducted successful peace enforcement operations in East Timor between September 1999 and February 2000. He lives in the eastern suburbs of Sydney.