Mr. Samuel Chandler

Mr. Chandler himself owns, that God might have formed other creatures than what he hath ; or produced some, or all of those which now exist, in a different manner from what he actually hath done ; he might, for instance, have stocked our earth with inhabitants at once, and formed them in the same manner as he did our first parents.And of consequence, as the present frame of things is owing to the wisdom, the good pleasure and will of God, so the fitnesses of things which now actually take place, and that particular system of moral virtue which mankind are obliged to regard, and conform themselves to, must, as far as it is a constitution of things actually existing, be resolved into the same good pleasure and will of God? Now, as the formation of creatures, and their production in this or the other manner, entirely depends on the will of God, and according to the variations of them, the fitnesses of things must have altered ; there would not have been the same fitnesses and unfitnesses, obligations and duties ; so it wholly depended on the will of God whether he would create any or no ; and if he had never formed any creature, in any manner whatever, as he might not have done, if be would, where had been this eternal nature and fitness of things? As therefore the formation of creatures follows upon and is owing to the will of God, the nature and fitness of things, with respect to these creatures ; cannot be prior, but must be subsequent to the will of God.Yea, this same Gentleman says, that the will of God is not any thing distinct from the everlasting fitnesses of things ; but included in them, and indeed a necessary and essential branch of them.If therefore the will of God is not distinct from them, is included in them, and a necessary and essential branch of them ; then the nature and fitness of things is not without the will of God, is not prior to it, and independent of it. And though this same writer boldly asserts in one place, that the certain and immutable difference of things is entirely independent of the will of God ; yet in other places he seems to stagger a little, and says, that this distinction is not originally and properly the mere effect of the divine order and will, and is not merely the result of the determination and arbitrary will of another ; as if it was so in part, or in some sense, though not wholly and entirely so.He seems to be fearful, that if the distinction of moral good and evil, and the fitness and unfitness of things, are placed to the will of God, and made to depend upon it, the consequence may be, that these things will not continue the same ; vice may be virtue, and virtue vice ; impiety, injustice, and cruelty, may be substituted in the room of piety, justice and charity ; and, that there can be, no possible certainty that God shall always will that which is now good, in opposition to what is now called evil ; but the one or the other, as caprice and humour shall direct him, which immediately becomes either good or evil ; and on the contrary, evil or good, for no other reason, but because he, without reason, wills them to be so. Not to take notice of indecency, and irreverence of these expressions ; the insinuations and suggestions of instability and change in the divine will, are groundless and unreasonable, since the will of God is as immutable as himself ; and though it is not determined by the, intrinsic difference of things without him, yet it is determined invariably by the rectitude of his nature ; he cannot determine, or do any thing contrary to his moral perfections ; he cannot deny himself.There is much more reason to fear these things may change, if the distinction between them lies in the nature and fitness of things, of which not only fallible men, but sinful men, men prone to vice, are the only judges ; who being either led into a false way of reasoning, or influenced by their interests and, passions ; may put evil for good, and good for evil. Moreover, why should not the distinction of moral good and evil be attributed to, and considered as, dependent upon the unalterable will of God, since all moral good flows from, him as the fountain of it? Nor could there have been any moral evil, without his permissive will ; even as the productions of light and darkness, of bitter and sweet, are the effects of his will and pleasure.Light and darkness are his own formation ; I form the light, and create darkness ; I make peace, and create evil ; I the Lord do all these things. (Isa. 45 : 7) It was he that said, by his almighty power, and according to his own will, Let there be light, and there was light.What difference should we have been capable of discerning between light and darkness, if God, of his own pleasure, had not divided the light from the darkness, as he did? Nor have we any idea of the distinction of these things, but what that God of his will has given to us ; who called the light day, and the darkness night. (Gen. 1 : 3, 4) As natural light and darkness are of God, and the division between them is made by him ; so moral light and moral darkness are, the one by his effective, the other by his permissive will ; and the difference between them settled by the determinations of his unchangeable mind, agreeable to the perfections of his nature.It is he that has made bitter and sweet, and of his own will and pleasure has put these different qualities in things ; the fitnesses and unfitnesses of which are their agreement and disagreement with those laws and rules of nature, which God, of his own will, has placed in sensitive beings ; and even so moral fitnesses and unfitnesses are their agreement and disagreement with those moral laws, which are the determination of God's will according to the rectitude of his nature ; which of his own pleasure he inscribed on the heart of man in his creation, and has since delivered in writing, as the rule of his actions.To all which I only add, in opposition to this notion, that if this distinction of moral good and evil, this moral nature and fitness of things, is prior to, and independent of the will of God, it must be prior to the first cause, which is a contradiction in terms ; for the will of God is the first cause of all things ; nothing in the whole compass of being exists without the will of God, but his own being and perfections ; and if this is coeternal with God and is as independent of his order or will as his own being, perfection, and happiness, it must as has been already observed, necessarily exist, and consequently, must be God ; yea, superior to him whom we call so ; since,.

4. It is said, that this is itself that necessary, invariable, and eternal rule, by which God himself regulates and determines his own will and conduct to his creatures, -is the great reason and measure of all his actions towards his creatures, -is the one certain and unerring rule of God himself ; than which nothing is more contrary to divine revelation, which assures us, that our God is in the heavens ; he hath done whatsoever he pleased ; (Ps. 115 : 3) that he works all things after the counsel of his own will ; (Eph. 1 : 11) and, that he does according to his will in the army of the heavens, and among the inhabitants of the earth. (Dan. 4 : 35) Whereas, according to this notion, not the will of God, but something prior to it, and independent of it, is the necessary, eternal, invariable, unerring rule, reason and measure of all his actions, towards his creatures.This scents something like the Stoical fate and necessity, which give laws to God and man, and equally bind and oblige both ; though sometimes the Stoics indeed consider fate and the nature of things, not as things distinct from God, but as being himself, his own will in which their notion is greatly to be preferred to what is now advanced.Be it so, that the moral nature and fitness of things is a rule of action to men ; that which is a rule to them cannot in every thing be thought to be so to God ; for instance, let it be admitted, that it is agreeable to the nature and fitness of things, and to the original difference between moral good and evil, that one man should not take away the life of another, and that law, Thou shalt not kill, is established upon this certain and immutable distinction and fitness, and so is a rule of action to men ; yet this is no rule to God, nor any measure of his actions ; who, as he gives, and has power over, the lives of men, can take them away at his pleasure ; as well by ordering one man to slay another, as Abraham to sacrifice his son, (Gen. 22 : 2) and the Israelites to slay every man his brother, every man his companion, and every man his neighbour, (Exo. 32 : 27) when there fell that day, and in that manner, about three thousand men ; as by sending a fever, a dropsy, or any other distemper.Again, let it be allowed, that it is one branch of this moral nature and fitness of things, that one man should not take away the property of another ; and that that law is founded upon it, Thou shalt not steal : yet God is not bound by this law ; for, as the earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof? (Ps. 24 : 1) he disposes of it as he pleases, and takes away that which was one man's property, and gives it to another ; which he has done in ten thousand instances of providence ; and what is more, and full to our purpose, he could, and did order the Israel