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This profile was automatically generated using 34 references found on the Internet. This information has not been verified. Learn more...
This profile was automatically generated using 34 references found on the Internet. This information has not been verified. Learn more...
View all 34 references Web References
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1. www.cnn.com
www.cnn.com/2008/US/06/10/slee - [Cached]Published on: 1/1/2008 Last Visited: 6/11/2008
"After a duty period of about 10 to 12 hours, the number of observed accidents increased exponentially," NTSB staff member Malcolm Brenner said. -
2. NTSB V Page
safety.alpa.org/submissions/v. - [Cached]Published on: 5/26/2006 Last Visited: 12/6/2007
Malcolm Brenner, NTSB Human Performance Group Chairman for this accident, participated in the Boeing-conducted tests. According to his June 12, 1997 memo, Dr. Brenner stated that he occupied the right cockpit seat during these tests while wearing his seat belt. He stated that he was required to position his seat in the "full back position for leg room comfort." He noted that he is the same height as was the first officer of USAir 427 (6'3"). According to Dr. Brenner's memo, "It should be noted that my leg inseam (34) is 2-3 inches shorter than that of the [USAir 427] first officer (36-37)." Prior to beginning the demonstration, Dr. Brenner stated that they sat in a newly manufactured B737 airplane and manipulated the rudder pedals to gain experience with the feel of a normally functioning B737 rudder system. According to Dr. Brenner's June 12, 1997 memo:
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Dr. Brenner's memo continued:
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To summarize, Dr. Brenner found that when the slide jams were introduced, pressing on the opposite rudder pedal did not resolve the jam. He stated that the movement against his foot pressure was "unrelenting," meaning that no matter how hard he pushed on the pedal, the harder it seemed that the pedal was being forced against his foot. In one case (the 25% off neutral simulated jam), the only way to neutralize the rudder and return it to its normal state of usage was to release all rudder pedal pressure. In another simulated jam (the 50% off neutral jam), Dr. Brenner found that releasing rudder pedal pressure had no effect on stopping the uncommanded rudder movement.
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However, using Dr. Brenner's remarks from above, ALPA concludes that the more pressure that the first officer applied to the right rudder pedal, the more likely it became that the rudder reversal would not clear. The situation was perilous; the more the aircraft turned to the left, the stronger the first officer's tendency to apply increased right rudder pedal pressure; the harder he pushed on the right rudder pedal, the more certain it became that the jam would not clear.
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Brenner, Meyer and Cash (1996) state that the Russian work classifies stress in three categories, which are listed below.
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In his report to Dr. Malcolm Brenner, Chairman of the NTSB's Human Performance Group for this accident, dated March 29, 1996, Dr. Meyer explained:
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However, as discussed by Dr. Brenner in the previous section, in a rudder reversal situation, pushing on the opposite rudder has absolutely no effect on clearing the jam, and in fact, may only aggravate the situation.
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However, we note the independent observations of Dr. Malcolm Brenner, Chairman of the NTSB's Human Performance Group. Dr. Brenner told the Human Performance Group that he is 6'3" tall, the same height as was the first officer from the accident flight. Dr. Brenner stated that following the accident, he sat in the right seat of a Boeing 737-300 and adjusted the seat and rudder pedals through various extreme positions. He noted that regardless of seat position, he still had full use of all controls, including the rudder pedals. From this verbal report of Dr. Brenner's, we conclude that although we may never know the seat position of either pilot, this information is probably not relevant because regardless of seat position, the first officer would have had full use of all flight controls. -
3. Daily Herald - Investigators say pilot error caused Kirksville plane crash
www.newutah.com/content/view/1 - [Cached]Published on: 1/25/2006 Last Visited: 1/26/2006
Pilot fatigue also was a factor, said NTSB investigator Malcolm Brenner, as the pilots had been on duty for more than 14 hours at the time of the 7:37 p.m. crash.

