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This profile was last updated on 2/13/13  and contains information from public web pages and contributions from the ZoomInfo community.

Mr. Tadashi Okamura

Wrong Tadashi Okamura?


Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry

Employment History


  • bachelor's degree
198 Total References
Web References
JCCI Chairman Tadashi ..., 13 Feb 2013 [cached]
JCCI Chairman Tadashi Okamura said "business confidence at the moment is very strong.
Uranium Stocks - Uranium Stocks - Japan, Under Pressure, Backs Off Goal to Phase Out Nuclear Power by 2040, 19 Sept 2012 [cached]
The deadline "was not a viable option in the first place," Tadashi Okamura, chairman of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said at a news conference.
"We cannot afford to delay the ..., 13 July 2010 [cached]
"We cannot afford to delay the national policy even for a second," Tadashi Okamura, president of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said.
"I want not only the ruling parties but also the opposition to share the sense of crisis," said Okamura, a former chairman of electronics and nuclear plant giant Toshiba. Japan stood at a "crucial crossroad," he said.
Tadashi Okamura 1938— Biography - Builds career in marketing at toshiba, 19 May 2015 [cached]
Tadashi Okamura 1938- Biography
Tadashi Okamura
Before entering the world of the computer age, Tadashi Okamura studied under the prestigious Faculty of Law at the University of Tokyo. He came to work at Toshiba in various positions before heading to the United States to earn a masters degree in business administration from the University of Wisconsin in 1973. He received praise in his early years with the company for overseeing several shifts in the technology market. When he was appointed the chief executive officer of Toshiba in 2000, the company was facing many difficulties. Okamura took over and continued the efforts of the former CEO. However, he also began making drastic decisions to raise profits and remain current in the ever-changing technology market. The economic downturn in the industry impacted Toshibas profit margins, but with Okamuras efforts at diversification and opening up production outside of Japan, some of the downward trends were averted.
Okamura moved up the ranks at Toshiba over four decades before earning the top slot of chief executive officer. One of his first positions with Toshiba involved overseeing a shift from analog to digital technology in a gear control for heavy manufacturing. His success earned him the position of communications director as that division turned from telecom to Internet-based devices.
As vice president Okamura headed the Information and Industrial Systems division, a very high-profile section of Toshiba. Industry insiders placed Okamura in the category of business leaders in Japan who had learned the electronics business in the 1960s and 1970s, when Japan ruled the electronics market.
Okamura and Nishimuro hoped that the latters retirement would push some of the more resistant managers also to retire, leaving Okamura the freedom to implement the changes.
Okamura and Nishimuro hoped that the latters retirement would push some of the more resistant managers also to retire, leaving Okamura the freedom to implement the changes.
Almost immediately after taking over, Okamura began cutting costs and focusing Toshiba on investments for the future to sustain growth.
Okamura took the negative profit statements and the negative press coverage in stride. He credited his predecessor with having set the course for him to follow. He told Forbes magazine, It is like driving a big limousine. [Nishimuro] had the slow job of turning it around; all I had to do was put my foot on the accelerator (January 8, 2001).
When Okamura was appointed by the board of directors in 2000, he told BusinessWeek , In each area, I was in charge when there was a major shift, so Im not worried by the changes I see today (July 24, 2000).
With such competitors as NEC and Fujitsu already ahead of Toshiba in slashing costs and forging ahead with new acquisitions, Okamura looked forward to the challenge of making Toshiba an equal competitor in the marketplace.
The first change Okamura made at Toshiba headquarters symbolized what he hoped the company portrayed to the world. He had employees dismantle satellite and fast-breeder reactor models that had greeted visitors to the Tokyo headquarters since 1984. Okamura told BusinessWeek , Power plants and satellites are no longer symbols of where Toshiba is headed (July 24, 2000).
As Okamura took over Toshiba, Japan was in an economic upswing after a lengthy recession. Toshibas profits had been dwindling for three years, unlike those of its Japanese competitors. However, Toshiba was still overcoming its payout of $1 billion to disgruntled customers. As a result, Okamura moved decisively to bring the company into competition with rivals who had been paring down inefficient divisions while Toshiba fought the lawsuit. Okamura began his changes by revamping the computer chip portion of the company.
In 2000 sales of cell phones and chips were booming, and Okamura moved quickly to take advantage of the upswing in the market. Analysts noted that Toshiba was already ahead of its competitors with its memory chip, which retained data even when electricity might be lost. Even though other companies offered the same type of chip, Toshiba was one step ahead because its chip was specially suited to large memory items, such as the photographs in digital cameras or the music downloads on an MP3 player. The ownership of this patent put Toshiba in an advantageous position as Okamura took over leadership because other companies wanting to use the large-memory chip would have to pay a licensing fee to Toshiba. Analysts predicted that owning this license would put Toshiba in a very strong position in the market, particularly with the upsurge in sales of digital cameras and MP3 players.
Okamura also kept to the plan set before him to reform the company. His predecessor had begun slashing spending in the year before Okamura took over. Nishimuro cut areas such as energy and heavy equipment, emphasizing instead the smaller technologies in the information sector. Just months before Okamura became CEO, Nishimuro directed 80 percent of the companys research and capital spending to mobile Internet phones, personal computers, chips, and computer monitors.
Okamura, sensing the shift in the economic outlook for technology industries, stuck to the plan already instituted.
Within a year of his appointment, Okamura laid off nearly 20,000 Toshiba employees and moved the company away from the commodity chip business. He also invested $2.5 billion in Internet services. He opened negotiations with Time Warner over the installation of Internet content through cell phones. Industry insiders noted that Okamura would have to begin selling off portions of the conglomerate and pointed to Okamuras appointment as an adviser to a special interest group as an indicator that he understood very well the steps necessary to lessen Toshibas diversification. In 2000 Okamura breakfasted with the former U.S. president George H. W. Bush, who wanted Okamuras guidance for the Carlyle Group with a $750 million fund instituted to buy up pieces of Japanese businesses.
Okamura credited Nishimuros 1999 restructuring plan as the driving force behind the comeback.
Okamura protected the company from too much dependence on one source of profit, even as he continued to get rid of unprofitable sectors. He set up new divisions, which allowed alliances with rivals to reduce risk in the development of technologies. An industry insider compared the system to banks making syndicated loans. The new divisions allowed resources to be shared between the companies, thus reducing the risk of overly investing in one area that might not pan out in the marketplace.
However, analysts predicted in 2001 that Toshiba still faced obstacles in keeping on top of the game because it relied too heavily on Japanese factories, which cost more and kept product prices high within Toshiba. Okamuras plan of attack was not to lower prices but to offer products that came with more product features. In addition, Okamura opened Toshibas own laptop factory in Shanghai in 2001 and contracted out laptop production to a Taiwanese company.
Analysts criticized Okamura for keeping some of Toshibas unprofitable divisions, such as the Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) chip sector. They pointed to Okamuras reluctance to lay off employees as being harmful to profits, predicting that his lack of ruthlessness would not help the company achieve higher profits.
By the end of 2001 the global marketplace had hit a slump in the sale of chips, cell phones, and notebook computersall items heavily marketed by Toshiba. So even though Okamura started as CEO with a solid upswing, when Toshibas business year ended in March 2002, the company posted $2.1 billion in losses. As a result, Toshiba fell to 317 on the BusinessWeek list of top global technology firms, down from 254 in 2001.
Okamura expressed confidence despite the dismal figures. He continued to close plants and cut costs. He also cited the increased sales of memory flash chips, LCD panels, DVD players, and laptopsall strongholds in Toshibas production line.
Okamura asserted that the profits would begin to change because of all the measures he had taken, including pulling out of the DRAM business, despite critics claim that Okamura had not closed enough of these profit losers.
Although Okamura insisted that Toshiba would continue to draw in profits, analysts refused to give him their full support. In 2002 the yen strengthened while the U.S. dollar weakened considerably. Analysts predicted that if the U.S. economy continued its downward spiral, then Toshibas sales to that country
Mr. Tadashi Okamura, ..., 15 Sept 2013 [cached]
Mr. Tadashi Okamura, President and CEO of Toshiba Corporation, said: "We are delighted that the HD DVD format has been independently endorsed by Paramount Pictures, Universal Pictures, New Line Cinema, and Warner Bros. Studios. We sought to contribute to development of the format through a close dialogue with Hollywood studios and extensive technical discussions within the DVD Forum, an approach that has been validated by these endorsements.
"HD DVD offers the necessary combination of picture quality, content security and advanced features, including interactivity, plus reasonable manufacturing costs. We believe this is why HD DVD is gaining broad acceptance and has won the support of each of these four leading studios," Mr. Okamura continued.
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