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Wrong A.H. Nasution?

A.H. Nasution

Commander

Indonesia

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I agree to the Terms of Service and Privacy Policy. I understand that I will receive a subscription to ZoomInfo Community Edition at no charge in exchange for downloading and installing the ZoomInfo Contact Contributor utility which, among other features, involves sharing my business contacts as well as headers and signature blocks from emails that I receive.

Indonesia

Background Information

Employment History

Indonesia schools


Web References(5 Total References)


Workers Daily Internet Edition Year 2001 No. 184

www.rcpbml.org.uk [cached]

After the CIA's disastrous involvement in the regional rebellions of the late 1950s, Washington changed tack and now saw that its interests lay in building close ties with the Indonesian armed forces under its commander, General A.H. Nasution.In mid 1960, Nasution proved his worth by using special martial law powers to ban the communist party in three provinces, South Sumatra, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan.Liquidating SukarnoWhile on a visit to Washington in September 1960 for talks with the State and Defence Departments, General Nasution was given an assurance of US support in the event of a showdown between him and Sukarno over the communist issue.Assistant Secretary of State Graham Parsons was given the authority to tell Nasution that "we are aware of and heartened by recent actions which the Army has taken to curb Communist power ...We would like General Nasution to feel that the United States would wish to be helpful to Indonesia too in such circumstances."(1) Five years later, the US had the chance to honour that pledge.Weighing up what the US could do to "shape developments to our advantage", Green set out a number of guidelines, Point B of which was: "Covertly indicate clearly to key people in army such as Nasution and Suharto our desire to be of assistance where we can", while Point E was: "Spread the story of PKI's guilt, treachery and brutality (this priority effort is perhaps the most needed immediate assistance we can give army if we can find way to do it without identifying it solely or largely as US effort)."(6)


Indonesia military generals arms

www.inagate.com [cached]

A.H. Nasution Sumitro: Indonesia Economics Guru dies Nasution 1960


TAPOL

tapol.gn.apc.org [cached]

After the CIA’s disastrous involvement in the regional rebellions of the late 1950s, Washington changed tack and now saw that its interests lay in building close ties with the Indonesian armed forces under its commander, General A.H. Nasution.
In mid 1960, Nasution proved his worth by using special martial law powers to ban the communist party in three provinces, South Sumatra, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan. (The bans were later rescinded on the president’s orders.) Liquidating Sukarno While on a visit to Washington in September 1960 for talks with the State and Defence Departments, General Nasution was given an assurance of US support in the event of a showdown between him and Sukarno over the communist issue. Assistant Secretary of State Graham Parsons was given the authority to tell Nasution that ‘we are aware of and heartened by recent actions which the Army has taken to curb Communist power... If American help is wanted in the form of military and economic assistance, the United States in such circumstances does its best to be helpful and quickly...We would like General Nasution to feel that the United States would wish to be helpful to Indonesia too in such circumstances.’(1) Five years later, the US had the chance to honour that pledge. Suitable propaganda themes might be: PKI brutality in murdering Generals and Nasution’s daughter... PKI subverting Indonesia as agents of foreign Communists... Weighing up what the US could do to ‘shape developments to our advantage’, Green set out a number of guidelines, Point B of which was: ‘Covertly indicate clearly to key people in army such as Nasution and Suharto our desire to be of assistance where we can’, while Point E was: ‘Spread the story of PKI’s guilt, treachery and brutality (this priority effort is perhaps the most needed immediate assistance we can give army if we can find way to do it without identifying it solely or largely as US effort.’(6)


TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

www.tapol.gn.apc.org [cached]

After the CIA's disastrous involvement in the regional rebellions of the late 1950s, Washington changed tack and now saw that its interests lay in building close ties with the Indonesian armed forces under its commander, General A.H. Nasution.In mid 1960, Nasution proved his worth by using special martial law powers to ban the communist party in three provinces, South Sumatra, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan. (The bans were later rescinded on the president's orders.)Liquidating Sukarno While on a visit to Washington in September 1960 for talks with the State and Defence Departments, General Nasution was given an assurance of US support in the event of a showdown between him and Sukarno over the communist issue.Assistant Secretary of State Graham Parsons was given the authority to tell Nasution that 'we are aware of and heartened by recent actions which the Army has taken to curb Communist power ...We would like General Nasution to feel that the United States would wish to be helpful to Indonesia too in such circumstances.'(1) Five years later, the US had the chance to honour that pledge.Britain was also in on the act.A CIA memorandum of June 1962 stated that President Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had agreed at a meeting in April that year that it was desirable to 'liquidate' Sukarno, 'depending on the situation and available circumstances'.(2) Britain's hostility towards Sukarno went back many years and intensified after he launched his konfrontasi policy against the establishment of Malaysia in 1963.Weighing up what the US could do to 'shape developments to our advantage', Green set out a number of guidelines, Point B of which was: 'Covertly indicate clearly to key people in army such as Nasution and Suharto our desire to be of assistance where we can', while Point E was: 'Spread the story of PKI's guilt, treachery and brutality (this priority effort is perhaps the most needed immediate assistance we can give army if we can find way to do it without identifying it solely or largely as US effort.'(6)


tapol.gn.apc.org

After the CIA's disastrous involvement in the regional rebellions of the late 1950s, Washington changed tack and now saw that its interests lay in building close ties with the Indonesian armed forces under its commander, General A.H. Nasution.In mid 1960, Nasution proved his worth by using special martial law powers to ban the communist party in three provinces, South Sumatra, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan. (The bans were later rescinded on the president's orders.)Liquidating Sukarno While on a visit to Washington in September 1960 for talks with the State and Defence Departments, General Nasution was given an assurance of US support in the event of a showdown between him and Sukarno over the communist issue.Assistant Secretary of State Graham Parsons was given the authority to tell Nasution that 'we are aware of and heartened by recent actions which the Army has taken to curb Communist power ...We would like General Nasution to feel that the United States would wish to be helpful to Indonesia too in such circumstances.'(1) Five years later, the US had the chance to honour that pledge.Weighing up what the US could do to 'shape developments to our advantage', Green set out a number of guidelines, Point B of which was: 'Covertly indicate clearly to key people in army such as Nasution and Suharto our desire to be of assistance where we can', while Point E was: 'Spread the story of PKI's guilt, treachery and brutality (this priority effort is perhaps the most needed immediate assistance we can give army if we can find way to do it without identifying it solely or largely as US effort.'(6)


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